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ABSTRACT
Asian businesses in the 21st century will learn from the experience of their US 
counterparts in promoting better governance of executive compensation in publicly-
traded companies. In this paper we examine the membership of the compensation peer 
groups for 121 of the largest US-headquartered, publicly-traded firms.  We find that 
the existence of self-reinforcing recursive relationships through peer groups is 
pervasive.  We illustrate that the effects from these relationships could be very large.  
Finally, we measure the association between the size of a firm’s recursive effect and 
that firm’s average compensation for named executives. The association is large, 
positive, and statistically significant.  Thus our findings suggest that recursive 
relationships arising from the widespread use of peer-group benchmarking is affecting 
executive compensation levels for many large US firms. These findings should alert 
Asian businesses to the effect that the practice of peer-group benchmarking may have 
on executive compensation
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INTRODUCTION
The use of peer group compensation data as an input to setting executive compensation levels has been 
the subject of criticism. Practices drawing criticism include setting target levels for compensation at the 
high end of the range of a firm’s peer group and strategically selecting highly-compensating ‘peers’ for 
benchmarking. Inherent in these criticisms is the presumption of intentional devious behavior to 
increase compensation levels.  We doubt that such behavior is common among the compensation 
committees of large publicly traded firms. However, the current study examines a previously 
unidentified effect that is unlikely to be intentional but is commonplace: the effect from recursive 
relationships that arise naturally through the wide-spread use of peer-group benchmarking.
To demonstrate the extent of the potential problem, the membership of the executive compensation peer 
groups for 121 of the largest US headquartered, publicly-traded firms were gathered. A recursive 
relationship exists when there is a set of linkages between the peer groups that forms a continuous loop 
from a firm back to itself. An analysis reveals the existence of pervasive recursive relationships.  The 
potential effect of these relationships on subsequent compensation adjustments is then estimated. 
Finally, an association is shown to exist between the size of a firm’s recursive effect and the average 
compensation paid to that firm’s top five named executives.  These results suggest that recursive 
relationships may be having a hitherto unrecognized effect on executive compensation levels for US 
firms. 
RELATED LITERATURE
Recently, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) have noted the wide spread use of peer group 
benchmarking.  In a sample of 100 compensation committee reports taken from the 1997 annual reports
of S&P 500 firms, they found that “96 firms indicated that they use benchmarking or peer groups” and 
“the vast majority of the firms that use peer groups target pay levels at or above the 50th percentile of 
their peer group” (p153).
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Bizjak et al have examined the pattern of changes in executive compensation for firms over time.  They 
found that executives whose pay in a period was below the median of their peers in similar sized firms
received larger pay increases in subsequent periods than those who had been paid above the median.  
They conclude that “the use of peer groups and competitive benchmarking has a nontrivial effect on 
changes in pay of the CEO” (p 166).
Faulkender and Yang (2007) also investigated the use of peer groups.  They examined the 83 S&P 500 
firms that reported their peer group members for executive compensation for fiscal 2005.  Faulkender 
and Yang examined the explanatory power of peer group pay levels against other common variables 
used to explain differences in pay (such as firm size and stock return).  They conclude, “Inclusion of 
measures of the median or 75th percentile of compensation for the group dominates other characteristics 
that have traditionally been used to explain cross-sectional variation in executive pay” (p 17).
Given the important role that levels of peer group compensation play, Faulkender and Yang then 
examined characteristics of the firms selected to be members of peer groups.  While firms frequently 
select peer group members of approximately the same size and from the same industry, they also found 
evidence that some ‘peers’ may be selected because they compensate highly: “Compensation 
committees seem to be endorsing compensation peer groups that include unrelated firms because such 
firms would potentially ratchet up the level of pay for the CEOs” (p 3). The potential motivation for 
such behavior is addressed by Bebchuk and Fried (2003). They point out that both outside directors and 
compensation consultants have strong incentives to benefit a company’s CEO because of the CEO’s 
influence on the continuing tenure of the board member and the consultant.
An article in the popular financial press (Morgenson 2006) also expresses skepticism on the use of peer 
group membership for compensation benchmarking.  It notes the issue of ‘cherry picking’ peers to 
establish a high standard for comparison.  The author further observes that not all firms can have their 
executive salaries positioned in the top quartile of firms.  If many firms strive to be at the top end of the 
compensation distribution there will be a further ratchet effect on compensation over time (humorously 
referred to as the ‘Lake Woebegone Effect’).
It appears that as potential abuses of the benchmarking process become known, steps are taken to 
mitigate them.  The website for Mercer Human Resources (2007) and an article by two members of the 
human resources group at Pricewaterhouse Coopers (Olsen and Tabacznski 2007) both warn firms that 
there should be good justification for the selection of a company’s peers.  Both sources then list several 
criteria that will help provide justification (such as size, competitors for managerial talent, and 
industry). However, both consultants recommend the use of compensation peer groups, with Olsen and 
Tabacznski recommending that a peer group contain 12 to 20 firms, and Mercer recommending groups 
with 10 to 15 members.  Our concern in the current study is that the wide-spread use of peer group 
benchmarking may lead to a previously unrecognized problem: the potential for self-reinforcing 
recursive relationships.
In 2006 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced new disclosure requirements on 
executive pay.   Annual reports with a balance sheet date after December 15, 2006 must now disclose 
considerably more detail on the process by which executive compensation levels are chosen.  The 
availability of this new data now makes it possible to study the recursive effects that may arise from the 
wide-spread use of peer group benchmarking.  That is, the process by which benchmarks are set may be 
free of intentional bias, but the widespread use of the process itself may introduce dynamic relations 
that influence compensation over time.
RECURSIVE PEER RELATIONSHIPS
A recursive relationship exists in a system when a change in a variable leads, through a chain of 
interactions, to another change in the same variable in a subsequent period.  “Feedback noise” in a 
public-address system is a frequently encountered example.  
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A simple illustration shows how recursive relationships might exist in a peer-group benchmarking 
system.  Consider three firms that use peer-group benchmarking for setting compensation levels: Firms 
A, B and C.  Each period the firms adjust their compensation to reflect their peer’s compensation in the 
prior period.  Further, A is a member of B and C’s peer group; B is a member of A’s peer group, while 
C is a member of 1both A and B’s peer group.  If Firm A raises its compensation in period zero1, the 
change will affect the peer-group compensation distribution for both Firms B and C in period one.  
There is no feedback loop to Firm A in period one. But when Firms B and C adjust their compensation 
in period one, in reaction to A’s change in period zero, then two feedback loops are established for Firm 
A in period two.  The pyramid below traces the effects for Firm A and reveals that this system results 
in zero, two, one, and four recursive relationships for firm A in periods one through four respectively.  
Period 0              A Recursive Loops
Period 1                  B            C 0
Period 2                 A         A      B 2
Period 3 B       C B      C      A 1
Period 4 A A B A A B B C 4
The number of recursive loops varies for the three firms.  A similar analysis would show that this 
system yields zero, two, one, and four recursive loops for Firm B and zero, one, one, and two recursive 
loops for C in periods one through four.  
But not all sets of peer groups will result in recursive functions.  Thus, the widespread use of peer-
group benchmarking may lead to recursive relationships.  But whether it does, and whether they are 
significant, are empirical questions.  To determine if recursive functions actually exist among 
compensation peer groups we examined a sample of the largest firms headquartered in the US. A 
description of the methodology follows.
THE SAMPLE
The Yahoo! Stock Screener (2008) revealed there were 240 firms traded in the US whose market 
capitalization exceeded US$25 billion on May 11, 2008 (the day we started the project). Of these, 106 
were eliminated because they are not headquartered in the US, six did not provide peer-group details, 
one was an exchange traded fund, and proxy statements were not found for six firms.  This yielded a 
satisfactory sample of 121 firms.  Thus our analysis uses large, US headquartered, publicly-traded firms 
whose market capitalization exceeded US$25 billion2.
The most recent proxy statement as of June 2008 for each sample firm was reviewed to hand-gather the 
names of the members of the firm’s compensation-benchmarking peer group, and the amount of 
compensation paid to the top five named executives.  An initial analysis revealed that eight of the 
sample companies were not listed as a member of the compensation peer group for any of the other 121 
sample firms.  The remaining 113 firms appeared as a peer group member in from one to forty five of 
the other 121 firms.  The average number of peer groups in which the 121 firms appeared (this includes 
the eight firms which appear in one) was 11.9 with a standard deviation of 8.7.  Thus it appears there is 
ample opportunity for recursive relationships to exist.
                                               
1 Numerous reasons for the increase are possible: a reaction to inflation, a bid for retention, a reward for 
performance, and so on.  Our concern is not with the circumstances that give rise to the initial increase, 
but with the subsequent ramifications the change induces.
2The $25 billion cut off is a pre-selected screen available on the Yahoo! Stock Screener.  We wanted a 
sample of large firms as their compensation practices attract the most attention, but we had no reason to 
pick an alternative value for market capitalization so we used the available screen.
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RESULTS
The results that follow are for all 121 firms in the sample. However, in interpreting the results it should 
be noted that the eight firms which do not appear as a member of a peer group for any of the 121 
sample firms cannot be affected by a recursive function through these firms.  There were also two firms
who did not list any of the other firms in the sample as a peer.  Thus the maximum number of 121 firms 
for which we might identify recursive relations through peer-group membership is 111.  
Table 1 Panel A summarizes the recursive relationships found for the sample firms after two, three, and 
four periods.  In the second period there is at least one recursive loop through the peer groups for 108 of 
the firms.  This number increases to 109 and 111 after periods three and four.  Panel A also indicates 
that multiple recursive loops per firm are common.  Panel B presents the average number of recursive 
loops per firm, after periods two through seven (the pattern is clear so further periods were deemed
unnecessary).  
TABLE 1: Growth Over Time in the Number of Recursive Loops Through Compensation Peer 
Groups for 121 Large US-headquartered Publicly-traded Firms
Panel A: Number of Firms Having the Indicated Range of Recursive Loops in Periods Two Through 
Four
Loops in Period
Loops Two Three Four
0 13 12 10
1-5 51 18 2
6-10 40 10 4
11-15 10 4 7
16-20 6 5 2
21-30 1 8 2
31-40 12 1
41-50 4 2
51-100 28 13
101-500 20 29
500-1,000 20
1,001-5,000 28
5,001-9,999 1
TOTAL 121 121 121
Panel B:  The Average Number of Recursive Loops per Firm for Periods Two Through Seven
Average
Number
Period of Loops
2 6
3 53
4 738
5 11,055
6 174,963
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Taken together, Panels A and B of Table 1 indicate that recursive relationships through compensation 
peer groups for these firms is pervasive and the growth rate in the number of recursive loops over time 
is substantial.  However, the significance of these recursive relationships depends on the reaction that a 
firm makes to a change in compensation by a peer-group member.  If firms adjust their compensation 
negligibly in response to changes by a peer, there may be little effect from recursive functions.  In that 
case, the existence of even an enormous number of recursive functions may not be of practical 
significance.  But if compensation levels are responsive to changes by a peer the effect could be 
substantial.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE POSSIBLE SIZE OF RECURSIVE EFFECTS
The actual response a firm makes to a change in the compensation of one of its peer group members is
likely to vary across firms and even within firms over time. However, we use some plausible average 
values to illustrate what the potential size of the recursive effects might be.  
Basing a target compensation level on the average compensation of a peer group would make the firm’s 
compensation sensitive to a change by any member of the peer group.  To avoid such sensitivity, firms 
typically specify that they target their compensation level at some stated percentile among the 
distribution of their peer members’ compensation levels (most often the 50th or 75th percentile). Thus, in 
theory, a firm would react to a peer-group member’s change in compensation only if the change caused 
the peer to ‘leapfrog’ the firm at the critical percentile in its distribution. Thus a conservative estimate is 
that only a change in compensation for the peer-group member whose previous compensation abutted 
the critical percentile would lead to a reaction by the firm using the peer group as a guide.  Assuming 
random placement of peers within a group, we estimate the probability that a firm making a 
compensation change is at that critical percentile as 1/n where n is the number of members in the peer 
group.  Thus, for the initial illustration, we assume that on average firms make a 1/n unit change in
compensation in reaction to a one-unit change in a peer-group member’s compensation. 
The size of the resulting recursive effects are summarized in Table 2.  For the assumed reaction, the 
size of the recursive effect for 73 of the firms exceeds one per cent in period two.  However, the effects 
diminish over subsequent periods.  Thus, even though Table 1 shows rapid growth in the number of 
recursive loops, the very small reaction that we have assumed for the illustration in Table 2 overcomes
that growth to dampen the overall effect over time.  
TABLE 2: Summary of the Size of Each Firm’s Recursive Effect From a One-Unit Change in 
Executive Compensation After Two, Three and Four Periods
Size (as a Percent) of the 
Subsequent Recursive Effect From 
a One-unit Change in 
Compensation a
Number of Firms in Range for Periods
Two Three Four
<0.10 13 32 45
0.10-0.99 35 59 62
1.00-1.99 30 21 10
2.00-2.99 19 5 4
3.00-3.99 11 4
4.00-4.99 4
5.00-5.99 4
6.00-6.99 4
7.00-7.99 1
TOTAL 121 121 121
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Average Percent Effect (All Firms) 1.79 0.69 0.40
aAssuming that firms react to a one-unit change in a peer’s executive compensation by adjusting its 
subsequent compensation by 1/n where n is the total number of firms in the peer group.
We repeated the calculation of the potential size of the recursive effects with alternative response 
factors for the reaction to a change in a peer-group member’s compensation.  Instead of using 1/n as the 
probability that a peer member is at the critical percentile we used 2/n (if there are an even number of 
members in a peer group, a firm might react to a compensation change by a firm just above or just 
below it in the compensation distribution; alternately, a firm might not just match a change).  We also 
used 1.25/n, 1.5/n and 1.75/n.
Figure 1 provides a plot of the average size of the recursive effects for all 121 firms (including the ten 
firms for whom the value is zero) each period, for ten periods, using the various response parameters.  
With a response factor of 1.5/n the average size of the recursive effect increases very slightly over time.  
The increasing trend becomes more pronounced for 1.75/n and quite large for 2/n.  Thus there is the 
potential for recursive effects to have a substantial impact.
RECURSIVE EFFECTS AND COMPENSATION LEVELS
The number of recursive effects and the illustrated size of the effects suggest they may affect 
compensation outcomes.  We next examined the association between the relative size of a firm’s 
recursive effect (using 1/n as the response factor) and the average compensation level for that firm’s top 
five named executives3.  Panel A of Table 3 provides the results from fitting two models of 
compensation levels to the data.  Model One uses only a measure of firm size as an explanatory variable
for compensation levels.  Firm size was measured as the market capitalization of each firm on May 11, 
2008.  Market capitalization was chosen because it both reflects size and the market’s estimate of the 
prospects for a firm (and by extension the market’s collective happiness with top management).  
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TABLE 3: Executive Compensation Levels and Recursive Effects
Panel A:  Regression Estimates of Parameter Values for Two Models of Executive Compensation
Model Intercept Size Recursive Effect Adjusted R2
1 -3.01 3.06 0.071
(p=0.002)
2 -0.96 2.01 118.16 0.136
(p=0.014) (p=0.002)
The dependent variable in both models is the average total compensation (in millions) of each firm’s 
top five named executives.  Firm size is measured by the natural log of market capitalization (in 
billions).  The recursive effect in model two is the second period effect using 1/n as the response factor 
to a peer’s compensation change and n is the number of firms in the peer group.
Panel B:  Predicted Average Executive Compensation Levels Using Model 2 with the Indicated Values 
for Market Capitalization and Recursive Effects
Predicted Average Executive Compensation*
Market 
Capitalization Second Period Recursive Effect (Percentage)
(US$ Billion) 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5
25 7.1 8.2 9.4 10.6
50 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.0
75 9.3 10.4 11.6 12.8
100 9.8 11.0 12.2 13.4
*The model was estimated using observations from US$25 billion to US$100 billion for market 
capitalization and 0.0 to 7.7 percent for recursive effects.  Only 21 firms exceeded US$100 billion in 
market capitalization and only 15 had a second-period recursive effect larger than 3.5 so the ranges in 
the table cover most firms.
Consistent with other studies, the coefficient for the size variable in Model One is significant (p= 
0.002).  Model Two adds a variable representing the size of the firm’s recursive effect in period two. 
Table 3 reveals that the coefficient on the recursive effect is significant (p = 0.002), and the R2 for the 
model increases from 0.071 to 0.136.  Panel B presents the predicted average executive compensation 
level from Model 2 for a range of values for market capitalization and recursive effects4.  Both 
variables have similar large effects.   This result suggests that recursive effects play a significant role in 
the determination of compensation levels over time.
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3 Results for only the CEO are similar.
4 The model is nonlinear so a direct comparison of parameter values is not sufficient.
CONCLUSION
This investigation has shown that recursive relationships are prevalent through the compensation peer 
groups for large US headquartered firms.  Recursive loops were found to exist for 111 of the 121 largest 
publicly-traded US firms. The size of the effects on observed compensation levels were shown to be of 
a similar magnitude as the effect from firm size.  Thus the widespread use of peer-group benchmarking 
is likely contributing to changes in executive compensation among US firms. 
Our results show that recursive relationships are common among large US companies. Whether these 
results also apply to Asian companies is an open empirical question. But if the size of the set of 
potential comparators amongst Asian companies is smaller, the potential recursive effects could be 
much denser with larger consequent effects.
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